高负债危害经济增长没错

Excel表中出现的公式错误，可以威胁到著名的“90%规律”吗？最近，学界和政界正在热议这个话题。“当一国公共债务超过GDP的90%时，增长会显著下降”，成为美国共和党副总统候选人保罗·瑞安等欧美政策制定者支持预算紧缩的武器。Rogoff和Reinhart两位经济学家撰文为自己的研究辩护，强调高负债危害增长的结论坚实无误。

测试中可能遇到的词汇和知识：

contingent liabilities 或有债务。企业或政府由于过去的交易或事项形成的潜在义务，如未决诉讼，为他人提供的债务担保，巨额福利承诺等

entrenched [?n'tren(t)?t; en-] 根深蒂固的，确立的

throws···to the wind 把……抛到九霄云外

blasé about/dismissive of 对……无动于衷、不屑一顾

How to Pay for the War 凯恩斯1940年的名作，提出了战争融资的多种手段，包括强制储蓄，定量配给，增税，动用外汇、黄金储备和海外资产，以及通货膨胀

periphery [p?'r?f(?)r?] 外围，边缘

financial repression 金融压抑。是指市场机制未充分发挥的发展中国家所存在的金融管制过多、利率限制、信贷配额及金融资产单调等现象。

cram…into 塞满，填鸭

rote [r??t] 死记硬背，教条

take the edge off 削弱，使变钝

keep yields low 一点金融知识：资产的价格与其收益率成反比，购买越踊跃，则出售者就可以越低的收益率借钱。如国债这种较安全的资产，当投资者认为股票太危险时，会被积极抢购。

Austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem （787 words）

By Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, both are Harvard professors

The recent debate about the global economy has taken a distressingly simplistic turn. Some now argue that just because one cannot definitely prove very high debt is bad for growth (though the weight of the results still say it is), then high debt is not a problem. Looking beyond therecent public debate – we have already discussed our results on debt and growth(https://www.carmenreinhart.com/response-to-critics/) in that context – the debate needs to be reconnected to the facts.

Let us start with one: the ratios of debt to GDP are at historically high levels in many countries, many rising above previous wartime peaks. This is before adding in concerns over contingent liabilities on private sector balance sheets and underfunded old-age security and pension programmes. In the case of Germany, there is also the likely need to further cushion the debt loads of eurozone partners.

To be clear, no one should be arguing to stabilise debt, much less bring it down, until growth is more solidly entrenched. Faced with high borrowing costs, periphery countries in Europe face more limited alternatives.

Nevertheless, given current debt levels, enhanced stimulus should only be taken selectively and with due caution. Borrowing to finance productive infrastructure raises long-run potential growth, ultimately pulling debt ratios lower. We have argued this consistently since the outset of the crisis.

Ultra-Keynesians would go further and abandon any pretence of concern about longer-term debt reduction. It throws caution to the wind on debt. The basic rationale is that low interest rates make borrowing a free lunch.

Unfortunately, ultra-Keynesians are too dismissive of the risk of a rise in real interest rates. No one fully understands why rates have fallen so far so fast, and therefore no one can be sure for how long their current low level will be sustained.

John Maynard Keynes himself wrote How to Pay for the War in 1940 precisely because he was not blasé about large deficits – even in support of a cause as noble as a war of survival. Debt is a slow-moving variable that cannot be brought down too quickly. But interest rates can change rapidly.

True, research has identified factors that might combine to explain the sharp decline in rates. Greater concern over potentially devastating future events such as fresh financial meltdowns may be depressing rates. Similarly, the negative correlation between returns on stocks and long-term bonds, also makes bonds a better hedge. Emerging Asia's central banks have been great customers for advanced economy debt. But can these same factors be relied on to keep yields low indefinitely?

Economists simply have little idea how long it will be until rates begin to rise. If one accepts that maybe, just maybe, a significant rise in interest rates in the next decade might be a possibility, then plans for an unlimited open-ended surge in debt should give one pause.

What, then, can be done? We must remember that the choice is not simply betweentight-fisted austerity and freewheeling spending. Governments have used a wide range of options over the ages.

First and foremost, governments must be prepared to write down debts rather than continuing to absorb them. This principle applies to the senior debt of insolvent financial institutions, to peripheral eurozone debt and to mortgage debt in the US. For Europe, in particular, any reasonable endgame will require a large transfer from Germany to the periphery.

There are other tools. So-called “financial repression”, a non-transparent form of tax, may be coming to an institution near you. In its simplest form, governments cram debt into domestic pension funds, insurance companies and banks. How to Pay for the War was, in part, about creating “captive audiences” for government debt. Read the real Keynes, not rote Keynes, to understand our future.

One of us attracted considerable fire for suggesting moderately elevated inflation (say, 4-6% for a few years) at the outset of the crisis. However, a once-in-75-year crisis is precisely the time when central banks should expend some credibility to take the edge off public and private debts.

Structural reform always has to be part of the mix. In the US, for example, the bipartisan blueprint of the Simpson-Bowles commission had some very promising ideas for simplifying the tax codes.

There is a scholarly debate about the risks of high debt. We remain confident in the prevailing view in this field that high debt is associated with lower growth. Certainly, let's not fall into the trap of concluding that today's high debts are a non-issue. Keynes was not dismissive of debt. Why should we be?

请根据你所读到的文章内容，完成以下自测题目：

1.Why high debt/GDP ratios are dangerous, according to the article?

A.The ratios are at historically high levels in many countries.

B.This is before adding contingent liabilities.

C.It is likely that Germany has to further pay for euro partners' debts.

D.All of above.

答案(1)

2.What is the writers's opinion on interest rates?

A.The higher the rates, the better.

B.US and EU enjoy low rates partly because Asians are buying their bonds.

C.Higher interest rates in the future will encourage government borrowing.

D.A high level of debt inevitably pushes up interest rates.

答案(2)

3.What is the writers' suggestion to crisis-hit countries?

A.They should immediately bring the debt down.

B.They should take advantage of low borrowing cost.

C.They should invest in productive infrastructure that raises long-run growth.

D.They need not care about long-term debt reduction, just borrow and spend.

答案(3)

4.Why mention Keynes's How to Pay for the War (and twice)?

A.Because “austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem”.

B.Because Keynes was dismissive of debt.

C.Because Keynes's idea was exactly the reason why we get into the mess.

D.Just to appear high-class, in style and with high quality.

答案(4)

* * *

(1)答案：D.All of above.

解释：ABC都是正确的。由于第一段只是介绍背景，那么以Let us start with one开头的第二段，有足够经验的话，你就可以判断这是比较重要的总括性的内容。

(2)答案：B.US and EU enjoy low rates partly because Asians are buying their bonds.

解释：A显然不对，高利率意味着政府和企业都必须勒紧裤腰带过苦日子，C也不对。 D更不对，作者没有下此断言。

(3)答案：C.They should invest in productive infrastructure that raises long-run growth.

解释：作者在第一段就说，自己的失误令人苦恼地让极端凯恩斯主义者利用来鼓吹“把谨慎借贷抛到九霄云外”。作者强调，自己在危机之初就强调，欧债危机袭击的国家在经济增长稳定下来之前，不必急着“吃猛药”把债务率迅速将下来。所以AD不对。陷入危机的国家借贷成本很高，除了推行一定的紧缩，它们并没有太多选择。所以B也不对。

(4)答案：A.Because “austerity is not the only answer to a debt problem”.

解释：这是文章标题。通读全文我们可知作者一直在批判ultra-Keynesians不把债务当回事。而凯宗师当年写《如何为战争付款》一文，提出很多种筹资方式，正是因为他把债务当回事——即便为卫国战争也不愿累高债务。事实上文中还有多次提到，如Governments have used a wide range of options over the ages.如果一件事被反复强调，那一定很重要。至于D为了显得高端大气上档次……本篇速读专业性较强，不过可以很好地训练我们在较难的题材中抓出关键观点的能力。做完一篇后，你可以仔细回读和总结，长期练习下去，阅读能力一定有提高。